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Newton v. Kaiser Hospital: Defining the
Direct Victim
In Newton v. Kaiser Hospital,1 a father whose son was injured at
birth due to a negligent delivery brought an action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress against the hospital.2 The Court of
Appeal for the Third District of California held that the father stated
a cause of action for emotional distress 3 even though he was not
present during the delivery.4 The court ruled that a duty to both
parents arose from the contractual relationship between the hospital
and the mother.5 According to the Newton decision, the hospital
owed a duty of care to the mother as a party to the contract with
the hospital 6 and to the father as a beneficiary of that contract.
7
The court found that both parents stated claims for negligent infl-
iction of emotional distress as direct victims, 8 a cause of action first
set out by the California Supreme Court in Molien v. Kaiser Foun-
dation Hospitals.9 In addition to extending a tort duty to persons
not covered by prior case law, 10 the Newton court proposed a new
basis for defining and limiting the direct victim cause of action."
Part I of this note will examine the legal background of the issues
discussed in the Newton case. 12 Part II will summarize the facts and
1. 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1986).
2. Id. at 387-88, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91. This Note will focus on the father's cause of
action. For a discussion of the mother's cause of action see infra note 120.
3. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 387-88, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
4. Id. at 389, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
5. Id. at 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Direct victims have not yet been clearly defined. See infra text accompanying
notes 70-80 (discussion of problems in defining direct victim).
9. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 124-27.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 119-23.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 15-101.
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opinion of Newton. 3 Finally in part III, the legal ramifications of
the case on the law of emotional distress will be presented.' 4
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Early History
Tort law has traditionally protected interests in property and
personal safety, but early courts were reluctant to protect an indi-
vidual's interest in emotional tranquility.' 5 Judicial reluctance to allow
recovery for emotional harm was based on concerns about the
possibility of false claims, the speculative nature of damages for
emotional harm, and the prospect of increased litigation.' 6 The de-
velopment of the lav governing negligent infliction of emotional
distress reflects a balance between a policy of compensating victims
of negligent conduct and the need to rationally limit liability.1
When emotional distress resulted from a physical injury caused by
a defendant's negligent conduct, courts did allow recovery for the
emotional harm as a part of general damages for the physical injury.' 8
In the absence of a physical injury or a physical impact on the
plaintiff, however, many courts refused to allow recovery for emo-
tional distress or for the physical consequences of the emotional
13. See infra text accompanying notes 102-23.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 124-28.
15. "The interest in ... emotional tranquility ... is not ... of sufficient importance to
require others to refrain from conduct intended to or ... likely to cause ... [emotional]
disturbance." REsTAEMENT OF TORTS § 46 comment c (1934). The reluctance to protect the
interest in peace of mind from intentional interference is even more pronounced when the
interference is merely negligent. W. PROSSER, W. KEETON, D. Donas, R. KaToN & D. OVENs,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TBE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER & KEETON].
16. See Mitchell v. Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354-55 (1896). See also infra
note 17.
17. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 730-31, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 74 (1968) (neither the fear of fraudulent claims nor the difficulty of defining the limits of
liability "excuses the frustration of the natural justice upon which the mother's claim rests").
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969)
(every wrong should have a remedy, but the problem for the law is to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree); Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d
237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961) (fraud, extra litigation and
speculation are possibilities, but a court of justice should not deny a remedy to all because
some claims maybe fictitious).
18. Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 511, 111 P. 534, 539 (1910)
(jury may consider mental suffering endured because of injuries); Malone v. Hawley, 46 Cal.
409, 414 (1873) (in estimating damages jury may consider mental suffering sustained by reason
of the injury).
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disturbance. 9 Although originally intended to protect against spurious
claims, 20 the impact requirement was often reduced to a mere for-
mality when courts began allowing plaintiffs to recover for emotional
distress after a trivial impact such as getting dust in the eye,
21 or
being jostled or jarred in an automobile accident. 22
By 1961 most states had recognized that serious emotional distress
could occur in the absence of a physical impact and had rejected the
impact rule as an arbitrary limitation on recovery.
2 In 1963 the issue
came before the California Supreme Court in Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co.24 The court found that no California cases had
ever required application of the impact rule, and refused to adopt
such an approach.?
In the absence of an impact requirement, plaintiffs who were
within the "zone of danger" created by the defendant's conduct and
were thus put in fear for their own safety could recover for emotional
distress even though no direct physical injury or impact occurred.
26
19. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 54, at 363. Under the impact rule, a woman
who suffered a miscarriage after being severely frightened by a negligently driven team of
horses was denied recovery because the horses had stopped just before touching her. Mitchell
v. Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). See also Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co.,
168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (in absence of a contemporaneous physical injury, no
recovery for mental distress or its physical consequences); Ward v. New Jersey & S.R. Co.,
65 N.J. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900) (no recovery for injuries resulting from mere apprehension of
personal injury).
20. Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 108, 45 N.E. at 355.
21. See Porter v. Delaware, L. R.R., 73 N.J. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906).
22. See Zilinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (1961) (recovery not
denied if any impact, "however slight").
23. Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961). See also Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (overruled 1900 case
requiring impact); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967) (following
"modern rule" court rejected impact requirement).
24. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
25. Id. at 299, 379 P.2d at 515, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 35. While courts rejected the need for
a direct physical impact as a means of validating claims for emotional distress, they still
retained the traditional requirement that the emotional distress be manifested in some physical
symptom. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, § 54, at 364. See Sloane v. Southern Cal. R.R.,
III Cal. 668, 683, 44 P. 320, 323 (1896) (early case allowing recovery when bodily harm
resulted from mental suffering caused by negligence); Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal.
App. 2d 793, 795, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115, 116 (1967) (no recovery for emotional distress unaccom-
panied by physical harm); Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 235, 249 P.2d
843, 845 (1952) (if no physical suffering the law will not support award). In 1980 the California
Supreme Court rejected this requirement as an artificial limitation on recovery and expressed
the belief that the genuineness of a claim could be found "within the circumstances of a
case." Molien v. Kaiser Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 813, 616 P.2d 916, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
26. See, e.g., Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532 (1932)
(woman who was present when car crashed into a store could recover since physical symptoms
resulted in part from fear for own safety); Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434
(1934) (plaintiff who feared for her own safety when a car ran onto her land may recover).
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Theoretically, if no impact is required, courts could also allow
recovery to persons who suffered emotional distress after witnessing
an injury to another. However, in Amaya, the California Supreme
Court applied the "zone of danger" rule and denied recovery to a
mother who saw her son killed because she had not been in fear for
her own safety.27 Under this rule a plaintiff could recover for emo-
tional distress suffered as a result of witnessing an injury to another,
but only if the plaintiff had also been within the "zone of danger. ' 28
In Dillon v. Legg,29 California became the first state0 to allow
recovery by a plaintiff who was not endangered by the defendant's
conduct and whose emotional distress was due solely to the injury
of another.
31
B. The Bystander Cause of Action
In Dillon, the California Supreme Court rejected the "zone of danger"
rule and allowed a mere bystander to bring an action.32 The court
held that a mother who had seen her daughter killed in an automobile
accident stated a cause of action for emotional distress even though
the mother herself had not been endangered by the defendant's
negligent driving.33 In discarding the "zone of danger" requirement as
an arbitrary and unsatisfactory limitation on recovery,34 the Dillon
court stressed the importance of foreseeability in determining the
existence of a duty of care.35 Thus, in cases in which a defendant's
negligence toward one person will foreseeably cause a third person
27. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 298, 379 P.2d 513, 514, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33, 34 (1963). See also Moore v. Reed, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 44, 47, 319 P.2d 80,
81, 82 (1957) (plaintiff who saw husband injured from a location 130 feet from collision was
not in zone of danger and could not recover).
28. See discussion infra note 34.
29. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
30. Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from
Chaos, 33 HAsTiNGs L.J. 583, 583 (1982).
31. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
34. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. The court stated that the arbitrary
nature of the zone of danger rule was particularly evident in Dillon. Application of the rule
would have allowed recovery to the victim's sister, who may have been within the zone of
danger, while the mother, who was approximately 15 feet away from the sister and not in the
zone, would have been denied a cause of action. The court did not consider this difference in
location to be a reasonable basis for granting or denying recovery. Id.
35. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court restated the basic tort
principle that "fi]n the absence of overriding policy considerations ... foreseeability of risk
is of . .. primary importance in establishing the element of duty." Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at
919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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emotional distress, the defendant may also be liable to the third
person.16 The court set out three factors to be used as guidelines for
determining the foreseeability of harm. 37 The risk of serious emotional
harm would be reasonably foreseeable if the plaintiff was closely
related to the victim, 38 the plaintiff was located near the scene of the
accident, 39 and the plaintiff's distress resulted from the direct emo-
tional impact of a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident. 40
Two characteristics of the bystander cause of action are worth
emphasizing. First, the cause of action is derivative in nature. The
plaintiff suffers emotional distress solely because another person has
been injured by the defendant's negligent conduct. 4' Second, plaintiffs
must establish themselves as percipient witnesses by proving a sensory
and contemporaneous awareness of the accident or the negligent
conduct which caused the injury.42 In 1980, when confronted with a
plaintiff who did not meet the percipient witness requirement of the
bystander cause of action, the California Supreme Court established
36. See id.
37. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
38. Id. For examples of how the California courts have interpreted the close relationship
requirement, see Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977)
(cause of action to spouse); Vasquez-Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1507, 231
Cal. Rptr. 458 (1986) (cause of action to children who saw grandmother killed); Kriventsov v.
San Rafael Taxicabs, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1445, 229 Cal. Rptr. 1445 (1986) (uncle who lived
with nephew can state cause of action since members of extended family living in same
household develop requisite emotional relationship); Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55
Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976) (cause of action to foster mother).
39. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
40. Id. Although the court introduced these three requirements as guidelines, they have
sometimes been applied in a rigid and technical manner, leading to inconsistent and unsatis-
factory results. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1977). In Justus, the father was present during the delivery of a stillborn child. Id. at 585,
565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110. He saw the prolapsed cord, and knew the life of the
fetus was threatened, but was denied recovery because he did not witness the moment of death
and because he did not realize death had occurred until he was informed by the physician.
Id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111. Compare id. with Krouse v. Graham, 19
Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977). The court in Krouse held that a husband
stated a cause of action for emotional distress even though he did not see his wife hit by the
defendant's car. Id. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872. The husband established
a nonvisual perception of the accident since he was in the driver's seat, knew his wife was
standing outside the car removing groceries from the back seat, and saw the defendant's car
approaching her location at a fast rate of speed. Id. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.
3d 159, 182-90, 703 P.2d 1, 17-22, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 676-82 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing general dissatisfaction with the percipient witness requirement). See also Diamond,
Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward A Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives
for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 477 (1984).
41. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
42. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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the direct victim cause of action as an alternative theory43 of recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 44
C. The Direct Victim Cause of Action
1. Molien v. Kaiser Hospital
In Molien v. Kaiser Hospital45 the California Supreme Court held
that Molien stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress as a direct victim of the defendant's negligence.
46
Molien brought an action against Kaiser for emotional distress after
his wife was negligently misdiagnosed as having syphilis. Kaiser
required Mrs. Molien to inform her husband so he could be tested
for the disease.47 The tests showed that Molien did not have syphilis.
48
The couple suffered marital difficulties and emotional distress as a
result of the incorrect diagnosis. 49 The supreme court rejected the
defendant's argument that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action merely because he was not present when the defendant an-
nounced the erroneous diagnosis. 0
In characterizing Molien as a direct victim of the hospital's neg-
ligence, the California Supreme Court once again stressed the im-
portance of foreseeability. 51 The court held that an erroneous diagnosis
of syphilis would foreseeably cause emotional distress to a patient's
spouse as well as to the patient.5 2 The court reasoned that since the
disease is normally transmitted only by sexual relations, "both hus-
band and wife would experience anxiety, suspicion and hostility when
confronted with ... evidence of a ... noxious infidelity."53 Because
the misdiagnosis created a foreseeable risk of emotional harm to Mr.
Molien, the defendant's duty to exercise care in diagnosing Mrs.
43. One California judge suggests that the direct victim concept enunciated in Molien is
not new, but is a restatement of the traditional tort principle that individuals owe a duty of
care to those who are injured by their negligent conduct when the risk of harm is reasonably
foreseeable. Wiggins v. Royale Convalescent Hosp., 158 Cal. App. 3d 914, 922, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 2, 7 (1984) (Soneshine, J., dissenting).
44. Molien v. Kaiser Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
45. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
46. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
47. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
50. Id. at 921, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
51. Id. at 922, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
52. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
53. Id.
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Molien extended to Mr. Molien as well.5 4 The Molien court did not
clearly define a standard for determining when a plaintiff may state
a cause of action as a direct victim, other than to suggest that a
direct victim is a person whose injury is foreseeable.55 In Ochoa v.
Superior Court5 6 the California Supreme Court addressed the prob-
lem of defining a direct victim and distinguishing this class of
plaintiffs from bystanders.
2. Ochoa v. Superior Court
In Ochoa, the plaintiff sued the County of Santa Clara for
negligent infliction of emotional distress following the death of her
son, Rudy.57 Rudy was incarcerated in the county's juvenile facility
at the time he became 11.58 Despite the boy's worsening condition
and Mrs. Ochoa's repeated requests, the medical staff refused the
plaintiff permission to seek alternate health care for her son.59 Mrs.
Ochoa was distressed because of her son's condition and because she
felt his medical needs were being ignored 0 Rudy died three days
after becoming ill.61
In her action against the county, the plaintiff alternatively pleaded
causes of action under both Dillon and Molien.62 The trial court
sustained demurrers to both claims.63 In response to the plaintiff's
request for a writ of mandate, the California Supreme Court held
that Mrs. Ochoa could state a cause of action under Dillon.64 The
court then distinguished the case from Molien. Justice Broussard, in
dicta, 65 explained that in Ochoa the defendant's negligent conduct
54. Id.
55. Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in 1 CAnroRNA ToRTs §
5.04(4)(b) (Levy, Sachs & Golden, eds. 1986) [hereinafter cited as 1 CALFoRNA TORTS].
56. 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985). For a discussion of Ochoa
see Note, Ochoa v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County: New Grounds or Old Guidelines?,
17 PAC. L.J. 1027 (1986).
57. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 163, 703 P.2d at 3, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 164, 703 P.2d at 3, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
61. See id. at 163-64, 703 P.2d at 3-4, 216 Cal. Rptr. 663-64.
62. Id. at 165, 172, 703 P.2d at 4, 9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664, 669.
63. Id. at 164, 703 P.2d at 4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
64. Id. at 665. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussion of the Dillon
cause of action).
65. In his concurrence, Justice Grodin points out that the discussion of the direct victim
cause of action is dicta since the majority found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action
under Dillon. Ochoa, 30 Cal. 3d at 178, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (Grodin, J.,
concurring).
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was directed primarily toward Rudy and not his mother. 6 In the
words of the court, Mrs. Ochoa had merely "looked on as a helpless
bystander." 67 Justice Broussard explained that in Molien, however,
the defendant's negligent conduct was directed toward Mr. Molien ' 8
since the physician required Mrs. Molien to inform her husband of
the diagnosis and directed Mr. Molien to submit to tests for the
disease.6 9 While Chief Justice Bird, in her dissent, suggests that this
analysis narrowly construes Molien and would virtually limit the
direct victim cause of action to the facts of Molien,70 the California
Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the direct victim or delin-
eated the scope of this cause of action.
3. Defining Direct Victims: The Problem
The Molien court characterized a direct victim as a person whose
injury was reasonably foreseeable. 71 The absence of a more specific
definition resulted in conflicting decisions at the appellate level. 72
Some courts applied the broad foreseeability language of Molien to
justify extending a duty of care to persons who would have previously
been denied recovery, 73 while other courts declined to extend Molien
beyond its facts and adhered to the stricter standards of Dillon.7 4
This conflict reveals the confusion created by the Molien decision,
or more specifically, by the use of a general foreseeability standard
to define the direct victim. 75 Since bystanders, according to Dillon,




70. Id. at 190, 703 P.2d at 22, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
71. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text (discussion of Molien cause of action).
72. See Newton v. Kaiser Hosp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 390, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890, 892
(1986) (lack of definition has led to conflicting decisions at the appellate court level).
73. See, e.g., Accounts Adjustment Bureau v. Cooperman, 158 Cal. App. 3d 844, 848-
49, 204 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1984) (parents have cause of action under Molien against
psychologist who misdiagnosed child since parents distress foreseeable as a matter of law);
Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (1982) (father not present
at delivery of stillborn child may state cause of action as direct victim since under principle
of foreseeability negligent conduct directed to patient is also directed to spouse).
74. See Wiggins v. Royale Convalescent Hosp., 158 Cal. App. 3d 914, 917-18, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 2, 3-4 (1984) (wife who did not witness injury to husband in convalescent home may
not state cause of action as direct victim since her action is derived from injury to husband
and defendant's conduct not directed toward her); Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640,
649-50, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905, 909-10 (1980) (mother who did not witness death of child in
hospital emergency room did not state cause of action as direct victim since Molien did not
overrule Justus (for discussion of Justus see supra note 40)).
75. See I CALiFoRoA ToRTs, supra note 55, § 5.04(4)(b).
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are foreseeable victims, the Molien cause of action would appear to
encompass bystanders.76 Dillon, however, was not overruled by Mo-
lien,77 thus the two causes of action must coexist. If the two causes
of action coexist, a bystander would be defined as a person who
meets the Dillon requirements, and a direct victim would be anyone
else whose emotional distress is foreseeable. 78 This unsatisfactory
result leaves two questions unanswered. What, if anything, defines
or characterizes the class of direct victims that would distinguish
them from bystanders and justify allowing this class to state a cause
of action without having to meet the requirements of Dillon? Second,
given the acknowledged need to prevent the unlimited expansion of
liability,79 is there a principled basis for limiting the direct victim
class? In Ochoa, the California Supreme Court suggested that persons
may not qualify as direct victims unless the defendant's conduct is
directed toward them. 0 The Third District Court of Appeal has
developed a theory which defines this elusive class of plaintiffs in
terms of contractual relationships and does so in a manner which
clearly delineates the limits of the direct victim cause of action.
4. Direct Victims Defined by Contract: A Solution
The theory which the Third District Court of Appeal eventually
applied in Newton v. Kaiser Hospital,"' was first developed by that
court in a 1984 case, Andalon v. Superior Court. 2 In Andalon the
court, noting the lack of guidelines for determining the existence of
a direct victim cause of action, turned to an earlier theory of duty,
83
established by the California Supreme Court in Biakanja v. Irving. 4
In Biakanja, the California Supreme Court held that a notary public
who negligently prepared a will was liable to the intended beneficiary
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (court still applying
Dillon requirements).
78. See 1 CALiFoRNiA ToRxs, supra note 55, § 5.04(4)(b).
79. See PRossEn & KEON, supra note 15, § 54. See also Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441
P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (proper guidelines can indicate the extent of liability for
future cases); Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 179, 703 P.2d at 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (Grodin, J.,
concurring) (Dillon guidelines used as a means of guarding against unwarranted extensions of
liability).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69 (Ochoa court discusses direct victim cause
of action).
81. 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1986).
82. 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984).
83. Id. at 609, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
84. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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of the will for the losses which resulted when the will was found to
be invalid.85 According to the court, when an agreement contemplates
a direct benefit to particular persons, those individuals are foreseeable
victims of negligent performance and a duty should extend to those
persons despite their lack of privity1 6 Although the Biankanja "con-
tract" rationale has been used to establish a duty of care to plaintiffs
for pure economic harm, 87 the Andalon court used the analysis to
establish a duty to plaintiffs who suffer emotional distress as a result
of medical malpractice. 8s
In Andalon, the plaintiff's wife gave birth to a child with Down's
Syndrome.89 The complaint alleged that the physician negligently
failed to inform Mrs. Andalon about a diagnostic procedure which
would have detected the presence of the genetic defect. 90 Both parents
brought actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress following
the birth of the baby.
Since the plaintiffs could not recover under Dillon,9' the court
considered the direct victim cause of action, 92 and applied the Biak-
85. Id. at 651, 320 P.2d at 19.
86. Id. at 650-51, 320 P.2d at 19.
87. See, e.g., J'aire v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979)
(general contractor who contracted with lessor liable to lessee for economic losses due to
contractor's negligent delay); Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850,
447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (construction lender on housing development had duty
to subsequent home purchasers); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 821 (1961) (attorney liable to beneficaries for economic loss due to negligently drawn
will). For a discussion of tort duty for economic harm, see Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently
Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. Ray. 1513 (1985).
88. Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 904. Courts have been
reluctant to hold physicians liable for breach of contract, reasoning that doctors do not warrant
or guarantee successful results. See Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436
(1963) (physician only undertakes to give his best judgment and skill; application of ordinary
rules of contract law to contract between physician and patient is unjustified). Liability for
emotional harm under the theory developed by the Third District Court of Appeal, however,
is not for a breach of contract. Under this theory the contract serves only to establish a duty
in tort to parties or beneficiaries of the contract. Newton v. Kaiser Hosp., 184 Cal. App. 3d
386, 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890, 894 (1986). The plaintiff must still establish a prima facie case
of negligence.
89. Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 604, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
90. Id. at 611, 208 Cal. Rptr. 905.
91. Since the injury in question occurred at conception, the plaintiffs could not establish
a sensory perception of the event. Id. at 609 n.4, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 903 nA.
92. In Andalon the court was faced with a factual situation similar to that of Molien.
Plaintiffs were both husbands whose wives had doctor-patient relationships with the defendants.
Each husband's theory of recovery was based on the defendant's malpractice. The malpractice
in each case affected the couple's reproductive relationship. In both cases, the defendant's
conduct violated a personal interest of the husband. The Andalon court considered the injury
to Mr. Molien and to Mr. Andalon to be direct or nonderivative in nature. The court stated
that the defendant's conduct "directly implicated the interests of Mr. Molien" and that the
harm to Mr. Molien was "not merely derivative of Mrs. Molien's injury," specifically referring
to Mr. Molien's fear that he might also have syphilis. Id. at 610-11, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 904-
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anja analysis. The court suggested that Mr. Andalon
9 was a third
party beneficiary to a contract between the defendant and Mrs.
Andalon.94 As a member of the reproductive unit,
95 the plaintiff had
a personal interest in the reproductive choice the test results 
would
have provided.9 He suffered emotional distress because 
he was
deprived of that choice, not just because his wife and child 
suffered. 97
The court concluded that the doctor owed a duty of care 
to Mr.
Andalon because there was a nexus between the end and 
aim of the
contractual relationship and a significant personal interest 
of the
plaintiff.98 According to the court, Mr. Andalon was "manifestly 
a
direct beneficiary of the tort-duty imposed by the doctor-patient
relationship." 99 The court suggested that the existence of 
a contractual
relationship not only justifies the extension of a duty to 
the benefi-
ciary, 100 but also that such a relationship can serve as a rational 
basis
for defining the limits of the direct victim cause of action.:
10 Newton
applied and extended the theory developed in Andalon.
II. THE CASE
A. The Facts
Rebecca Nowlin'0 2 was under the care of Kaiser Hospital 
during
the delivery of her son, James Newton.
103 Since birth James has
05. The court implied that the nonderivative nature of the injury 
is a distinguishing characteristic
of the direct victim cause of action. The California Supreme Court, 
however, did not explicitly
make this distinction in Molien. In fact, the analysis centered 
on the emotional harm that
arose from the social and psychological implications which 
the disease carries. No explicit
mention was made of the apprehension Mr. Molien might have 
felt about his own health. See
supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussion 
of Molien). The analysis by the Molien
court, however, is not inconsistent with the concept of a nonderivative 
cause of action since
Mr. Molien would have suffered emotional harm from the 
misdiagnosis even if for some
reason his wife had not suffered an injury.
93. The court had little trouble finding that the doctor owed 
a duty to Mrs. Andalon.
See Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 611, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 
905. The discussion, therefore,
centered on the issue of whether the defendant owed a duty 
to Mr. Andalon. See id. For a
discussion of the duty owed to mothers, see infra note 120.
94. Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 611, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
95. In discussing the significance of the father's status as a 
member of the reproductive
unit, the court did not go into detail but simply stated 
that "[t]he burdens of parental
responsibility fall directly upon his shoulders." Id.
96. The court noted that only a woman has a legally enforceable 
right to make the final
choice regarding reproductive options, but found that Mr. 
Andalon could state a cause of
action if he could show that he would have been consulted by 
his wife regarding the decision.
Id. at 612 n.7, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.7.
97. Id. at 611, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Mr. Andalon's cause 
of action is not derivative.
See supra note 92 (nonderivative causes of action in Molien 
and Andalon).




101. Id. at 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
102. Mr. and Mrs. Newton were divorced and Mrs. Newton 
remarried. Telephone inquiry,
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suffered from a permanent and irreparable paralysis of the upperarm known as Erb's Palsey. 04 The condition allegedly resulted fromthe negligent application of forceps during James' delivery at thedefendant's medical facility.103 The use of forceps and the resulting
injury could have been avoided if the medical staff had performeda cesarean section rather than a vaginal delivery. 06 The mother, Mrs.
Nowlin, was unconscious during the delivery 07 and the father, RobertNewton, was not present. 03 The parents brought a medical malprac-
tice action against Kaiser Hospital on their own behalf for the
emotional distress they suffered as a result of James' injury.1 09
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's cause ofaction for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the groundsthat the plaintiffs did not witness the negligent conduct and weretherefore unable to state a cause of action under Dillon,110 On appeal,the court cited Andalon as authority in holding that each plaintiff
stated a cause of action as a direct victim."' The judgment ofdismissal was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions
to vacate the order of dismissal and enter an order overruling the
demurrer. 112
B. The Opinion
The Court of Appeal for the Third District reviewed Dillon andMolien."3 The court noted that since the California Supreme Courthad not defined "direct victim" in Molien, the difficult task ofdistinguishing between bystanders and direct victims and of estab-
lishing limits to the direct victim class had been left to the lowercourts." 4 Justice Sparks, writing for the majority, noted the resultingconflict in the appellate courts." 5 Justice Sparks declined to resolve




107. Id. at 389, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 388, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 891. The parents also brought an action against KaiserHospital on behalf of James for the injury he sustained at birth. Id.
110. Id. at 389, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
111. See id. at 391-92, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94.
112. Id. at 393, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
113. Id. at 389-90, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
114. Id. at 390, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
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this conflict, however, because he found that the issues raised by
Newton could be decided by reference to the court's prior decision
in Andalon.
116
The Andalon decision, the court explained, was an attempt to
provide a rational basis for delineating the Molien direct victim cause
of action by analyzing the concept of a direct victim under a theory
set out in Biakanja.17 According to the court, Biakanja held that
the duty of care for a tortious breach of contract extends to the
third party beneficiaries of that contract."8 The Newton court there-
fore held that a duty to both parents arose out of the contract
between Kaiser and Mrs. Nowlin." 9 The defendants owed a duty to
Mrs. Nowlin because she was a party to the contract. 20  Citing
Andalon and by implication Biakanja as authority, the court found
that a duty also extended to Mr. Newton who, as a member of the
reproductive unit, was a third-party beneficiary to the contract.'
2
1
In the final paragraph of the decision the Newton court, in very
broad language, states that a "duty of care may arise from contract
even though there would otherwise be none ... Kaiser's contract
[with Mrs. Nowlin] was the source of its duty and a determination
of foreseeability is unnecessary to establish a duty of care."'1 Ac-
116. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 391, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
120. Id. The court of appeal had little trouble finding that Mrs. Nowlin was a direct victim
since she was not only a party to the contract for the care of the baby, but was also a patient
of the defendant. Id. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 177 Cal. Rptr.
63 (1981). In Johnson the court states that the mother's relationship with the baby during
pregnancy and childbirth is sufficiently close to make emotional harm to the mother a
foreseeable result of harm to the baby, and the emotional distress should therefore be
compensable as part of the mother's malpractice action. Id. at 1007, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
Thus the significance of Newton is the extension of a duty of care to fathers and, by
implication, to mothers who are not themselves patients of the defendant.
121. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
122. Id. The language the court uses here is broad and suggests that the contract itself is
the basis of the duty. However, the rationale of Andalon and Biakanja suggests that the
contract gives rise to a duty because it establishes the foreseeability of harm to the victim.
Furthermore, the court cited Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 249 P.2d 257 (1952), for the
proposition that a contract will give rise to a tort duty where a duty would not otherwise
exist. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894. But in Eads, the contract gave
rise to a duty because the agreement established the foreseeability of an otherwise unforeseeable
harm. See Eads, 39 Cal. 2d at 812, 249 P.2d at 260-61. In Eads, the parents had a contract
with the defendant milk company to deliver milk to their home. The parents explained that
they were concerned about the safety of their young son and requested that the delivery man
not leave the glass milk bottles on the porch. Despite the agreement, the bottles were left on
the porch. The child dropped one and seriously injured himself. The court held that the
defendant owed a duty of care to the child because he was a third-party beneficiary to the
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cording to this court, only in the absence of a contractual relationship
should plaintiffs have to establish the foreseeability of the emotional
harm by meeting the requirements set out in Dillon."2
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The Newton decision represents a significant extension of prior
case law. The Newton court allowed a father to recover 24 for
emotional distress even though he was not a percipient witness to his
son's injury."2 Mr. Newton, like Mrs. Dillon, suffered only because
of an injury to another person. Unlike Mrs. Dillon, however, Mr.
Newton did not experience the traumatic impact of witnessing the
injury to his child. 1
26
Although the court characterizes Mr. Newton as a direct victim,
the holding extends a duty beyond the limits for direct victims
suggested in Ochoa since there is no indication that the defendant's
conduct was ever directed toward Mr. Newton. Newton also repre-
sents an extension of the direct victim cause of action since Mr.
Newton's claim is essentially derivative, while the claims of Mr.
Molien and Mr. Andalon were based on the violation of their own
personal interests. 27 Mr. Molien feared for his own health and his
marriage, while Mr. Andalon was deprived of a reproductive choice.
On the other hand, Mr. Newton suffered emotional distress solely
because his child was injured by the defendant's negligent conduct.
The decision in Newton has significant consequences. If a duty
arises from the contractual relationship, then all parents who contract
with physicians for the care of their children may have actions for
negligent infliction of emotional distress if the child is injured as a
result of the contracting physician's negligence. Under Newton, lia-
contract between the parents and the defendant. The duty arose because the contract had
made the risk of harm to the child foreseeable. Id. In Newton, the court stated that the
existence of a contract makes a determination of foreseeability unnecessary. Newton, 184 Cal.
App. 3d at 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894. In view of the underlying rationale of the cases cited
by the court, the court may be saying that the contract establishes the foreseeability and makes
further foreseeability analysis unnecessary.
123. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894. In a footnote, the Newton
court suggests that since the defendant in Ochoa had no contract with the mother or the son,
the defendant's duty to Mrs. Ochoa arose only under Dillon. Id. at 392 n.5, 228 Cal. Rptr.
at 894 n.5.
124. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 387-88, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
125. Id. at 389, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
126. See id.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97; see also supra note 92 (discussion of
nonderivative nature of Molien and Andalon claims).
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bility for the emotional distress of parents might also extend to other
medical and nonmedical professionals whose negligent conduct results
in an injury to a child. 12 At the same time the theory would deny
recovery to individuals whose emotional distress may be foreseeable
but who cannot establish the existence of a contractual relationship
with the defendant.
CONCLUSION
In Newton v. Kaiser Hospital, the California Court of Appeal for
the Third District ruled that parents whose child was injured at birth
as a result of a negligent delivery could bring a cause of action
against the hospital for negligent infliction of emotional distress even
though neither parent qualified as a percipient witness under Dillon.
The court found that a duty to both parents arose from the contract
between Kaiser and the mother, and allowed them both to state a
cause of action for emotional distress under Molien. Under Newton,
the class of direct victims would include only those persons who can
establish a contractual relationship with the defendant, either as a
party or a beneficiary. Persons who cannot establish a contractual
128. The "contract" language in the Newton opinion suggests a broad holding applying
to all contracts. The rationale of the cases cited by the court as authority and other language
used by the court, however, seem to suggest a narrower interpretation. The cases suggest that
the underlying relationships and expectations of the parties are important in establishing 
a
duty. For example, the court in Andalon speaks of "a direct beneficiary of the tort-duty
imposed by the doctor-patient relationship" and "the duty to Mr. Andalon arose out of the
doctor patient relationship." Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 611, 612, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 905,
906. In Newton, the court speaks of the obstetrician-patient relationship and of the plaintiffs
as direct victims of the negligent execution of this relationship. Newton, 184 Cal. App. 3d at
392, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894. Thus the holding in Newton may be confined to doctor-patient
relationships. Molien, Andalon, and Newton were all malpractice actions. The court in Andalon
specifically stated that their analysis served to place the Molien cause of action into a medical
malpractice setting. Andalon, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 904. Unique
expectations may attach to the doctor-patient relationship which are not found in other
contractual relationships. Furthermore, Molien, Andalon, and Newton all involved the repro-
ductive relationship. Newton focuses on the parent-child aspect of that relationship. Extending
a duty to parents who entrust the care of their children to physicians may not be unreasonable
when the physicians accept the responsibility knowing the parents will depend on them to
provide the medical care which the parents are unable to provide. Under these circumstances,
some measure of obligation running directly to the parents may well be within the contemplation
of the contracting parties. One court has already rejected the application of Newton in 
an
action brought by a wife whose husband died as a result of malpractice. See Kossel v. Superior
Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1068-69, 231 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188 (1986). In denying recovery
to the wife, the court pointed out that her injuries did not flow from the reproductive 
life of
the couple. Id. However, despite the importance of the underlying relationships and expecta-
tions, it is clear that under Newton a doctor-patient relationship will not give rise to a duty
to parents in the absence of a contract. See supra note 123 (Mrs. Ochoa not a direct victim
under Newton).
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relationship would be barred from recovery unless they can establish
a cause of action as a percipient witness under Dillon. The Newton
decision may extend recovery for emotional distress to all parents
whose children are injured as a result of medical malpractice, except
for those relatively rare instances when the medical care is not
rendered under a contract with a parent.
Karen A. Sparks
